The End of the State of Autonomies? An Analysis of the Controversy Surrounding the 2010 Spanish Constitutional Court Ruling on Catalonia\u27s 2006 Statute of Autonomy by Mermel, Kevin
University of Colorado, Boulder
CU Scholar
Undergraduate Honors Theses Honors Program
Spring 2016
The End of the State of Autonomies? An Analysis of
the Controversy Surrounding the 2010 Spanish
Constitutional Court Ruling on Catalonia's 2006
Statute of Autonomy
Kevin Mermel
kevin.mermel@colorado.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses
Part of the European History Commons, International and Area Studies Commons, and the
Political Science Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Honors Program at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors
Theses by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mermel, Kevin, "The End of the State of Autonomies? An Analysis of the Controversy Surrounding the 2010 Spanish Constitutional
Court Ruling on Catalonia's 2006 Statute of Autonomy" (2016). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 1218.
    Mermel 1 
The End of the State of Autonomies? 
An Analysis of the Controversy Surrounding the 2010 Spanish 
Constitutional Court Ruling on Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of Autonomy 
 
 
 
By: 
Kevin Mermel 
Dept. of International Affairs, University of Colorado Boulder 
 
 
Defended April 6, 2016 
Thesis Advisors: 
Dr. Benjamin Teitelbaum, Dept. of Germanic & Slavic Languages & 
Cultures 
Dr. Damian Doyle, The Program for Writing & Rhetoric 
Dr. Vicki Hunter, Dept. of International Affairs 
 
 
 
    Mermel 2 
 
ABSTRACT 
Kevin Mermel: The End of the State of Autonomies? 
Under the direction of Benjamin Teitelbaum 
 
In recent years, many citizens in the Spanish region of Catalonia have mobilized in favor of 
independence, a desire previously far outside the mainstream. As of the spring of 2016, 
separatists control the majority of seats in Catalan parliament. This study seeks to explain 
why independence is so widely supported in Catalonia, and focuses specifically on the 
region’s 2006 Statute of Autonomy, which the Spanish Constitutional Court modified in a 
2010 ruling. The struggles that the statute faced both before and after the court’s 2010 
ruling provided a crucial turning point in the debate over Catalan independence.  The 
political rhetoric and media reactions surrounding the court’s ruling serve as 
manifestations of longstanding conflicts within Spanish society and, in doing so, frame the 
larger issue of Catalan separatism. So, the controversy surrounding Catalonia’s 2006 
Statute of Autonomy provides a useful case study for understanding the ideological 
disputes within Spain that allowed for the current situation.  
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1. Introduction 
On July 10, 2010, Spain’s national soccer team was preparing to play in its first 
ever World Cup final the following day in Johannesburg, South Africa. Back home, the 
team’s run through the tournament had brought about a catharsis of pride in a country 
where many possess an inherent skepticism of overt nationalism, and where the country’s 
status as a diverse collection of regions and cultures has historically caused tension. Yet, 
in 2010, players from a number of these diverse regions came together to make up the 
national team: they hailed from the southern region of Andalusia, the capital of Madrid, 
and the culturally distinct Basque Country on the northern coast. After the team defeated 
Germany in the semifinal, midfielder Xavi Hernández declared, “we dedicate this victory 
to Spain” (Montague). 
 Xavi was just one of seven men on Spain’s roster who played for FC Barcelona, 
the beloved soccer team of the country’s second largest city. On July 10, as the Spanish 
team readied for the final match, huge crowds took to Barcelona’s streets in a mass 
expression of national pride. More than one million people filled the central 
thoroughfares of this bustling, cosmopolitan metropolis situated between soft rolling hills 
and the sparkling Mediterranean Sea. They shouted slogans, carried banners, and waved 
red and gold flags. Yet this demonstration had nothing to do with soccer. The colorful 
flags did not bear the Spanish coat of arms. In fact, the nation to which the demonstrators 
expressed their devotion was not Spain at all. Rather, they marched in support of 
Catalonia: the northeastern Spanish region with its own unique language, cultural 
symbols, and history as an independent state.  
    Mermel 5 
Catalonia’s regional government had called for the protest after June 28, 2010, 
when Spain’s Constitutional Court’s published its ruling that scaled back the reforms of 
Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of Autonomy. The court’s ruling marked the end of a four-year 
impasse, during which the statute – written to address years of tension and frustration 
with the political and economic troubles afflicting Catalonia – languished in a state of 
uncertainty, its constitutionality under review by the court.  
In the summer of 2010, many media and political commentators argued that the 
ruling marked the level of autonomy to which individual regions like Catalonia could 
aspire under Spain’s constitution. Given the context of Spanish history, this 
characterization presents the controversy over the court ruling as the continuation of a 
centuries-long conflict in Spain over how to account for the country’s pluralistic makeup. 
The ruling proved to be as momentous an occasion as the commentators had predicted, as 
in the following years, millions of Catalans began to embrace the prospect of their region 
regaining independence after three centuries spent in the Spanish state. Many observers 
point to the court’s ruling as a major factor, if not the definitive turning point, in bringing 
Catalan separatism into the mainstream.  
A cursory examination of mainstream news reports on Catalan separatism reveals 
a primary focus on the economic anxieties within Catalonia. The region pays far more in 
taxes than it receives from Madrid in public investment, a source of great frustration 
among Catalans, particularly given the severe economic crisis afflicting Spain. Similarly, 
scholarly literature on the issue often focuses on how welfare-oriented concerns – 
specifically, economic concerns and the belief that Catalonia would be financially and 
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materially better off as an independent state – fuel support for Catalan independence 
(Guibernau, “Young People’s Expectations” 114-115; Boylan 768).  
However, this study chooses to focus instead on the historical antecedents that 
allow for a climate in which separatist sentiment could take hold. The 2010 Spanish 
Constitutional Court Ruling on Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of Autonomy, and the 
controversy surrounding both of these documents, serves as a useful case study to 
understand the cleavages within Spanish society that led to the present situation. The 
study begins with an introduction of Catalonia as an entity, and a discussion of its history 
within the Spanish state. Next, the tumultuous climate of early 2000s Spain is described, 
in order to provide the immediate context for the 2006 statute. The statute is then detailed 
– beginning with the writing and negotiating processes that constructed it, and following 
with a discussion of its specific provisions and reforms. Then, the paper discusses the 
modifications made to this law by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2010. After this, a 
series of media and political reactions to the court’s ruling are reported. These reactions 
are analyzed within the context of Spanish socio-political history in order to explain the 
court ruling’s importance to the larger debate over Catalan independence. Then, the paper 
concludes by forecasting the movement’s manifestations going forward. 
The issue of Catalan separatism is worth studying due to its prominence within 
Catalonia, as well as its potential importance to the future of Spain and any other 
countries that could experience ripple effects should Catalonia achieved independence. 
The pro-independence movement is very strong and is unlikely to dissipate in the near 
future. Throughout the 2010s, opinion polls consistently showed support for 
independence in the high fifties and low sixties. More significantly, in Catalonia’s 
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September 2015 parliamentary elections, pro-independence parties won 47.9 percent of 
the overall vote and captured the majority of the seats (Kassam). Separatists argued that 
the election results proved victory for their cause (Kassam). On November 9, the new 
parliament approved a plan to initiate separation from Spain (Peralta). The Spanish 
Constitutional Court responded on December 2, blocking the motion and ruling that 
Spain’s constitution does not grant regions to right to secede (Zarolli). This situation has 
not yet been resolved.  
Since Catalonia is the wealthiest region in Spain, the outcome of the fight for 
independence could have profound economic effects on the country, and by extension the 
European Union. As Harriet Alexander writes in an article for The Telegraph, Catalan 
“secession would [ . . . ] cost Spain almost 20 per cent of its economic output, and trigger 
a row about how to carve up the sovereign’s 836 billion euros of debt.” These potentially 
far-reaching consequences of Catalan independence make the issue relevant, especially 
given the current economic crisis in Spain and, more broadly, the European Union.  
2. Methodology 
To build the foundations necessary to analyze Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of 
Autonomy and the 2010 Constitutional Court ruling on the statute, the paper consults a 
variety of academic sources, including monographs on Catalan history and articles that 
appear in academic journals of politics, culture, and law. The scholarly articles cited are 
mostly from the last ten years and discuss a wide range of topics relating to contemporary 
affairs in Catalonia, including economic distress, efforts to achieve cultural recognition, 
and support for independence. Some older scholarly articles are included in order to give 
a historical basis for the topics discussed. News articles are also used, often to provide 
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contemporary descriptions of specific events mentioned in this paper. These sources help 
provide an understanding of Spanish and Catalan sociopolitical history, as well as 
contemporary challenges that frame the events discussed. Three official government 
documents are also consulted – The Spanish Constitution, Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of 
Autonomy, and the Constitutional Court’s 2010 ruling on the Catalan statute – in order to 
build a case study. The majority of these articles and documents were found through the 
University of Colorado Boulder’s online databases. Many were located with assistance 
from the research assistance staff at Norlin Library, on the University of Colorado 
Boulder campus. Others were found with the assistance of Susanna Pérez-Pàmies, an 
instructor of Spanish language and Catalan language and culture classes in the Spanish 
and Portuguese department at the University of Colorado Boulder. 
    After establishing a thorough grounding both in Spanish sociocultural politics and 
laws relevant to Catalan independence, this paper explores more than thirty reactions to 
the court’s ruling by Spanish journalists and politicians in domestic Spanish and 
international media, comparing and contrasting the arguments of those for and against the 
court’s ruling on Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy.  Likewise, many of these articles were 
found with assistance from Norlin Library’s research staff. The vast majority of these 
reactions were originally printed in Spanish; some appeared in English; and one was in 
Catalan. Spanish language articles were translated with assistance from Professor Pérez-
Pàmies. The author of this paper made any and all translation mistakes. 
3. Catalonia: History and Identity 
As an entity, Catalonia dates back to the ninth century founding of the Royal 
House of Barcelona (Atwood Mason). According to historian Jaume Sobrequés i Callicó 
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in History of Catalonia, Catalonia remained a sovereign state through the middle ages, 
but Spain began to gradually subsume the region into its empire with the 15th century 
union of the crowns of Castile and Aragon through the marriage of Isabella and 
Ferdinand (51-52). After the adjoining of the two kingdoms, Catalonia officially 
maintained control over its own affairs (53). However, perceived overreach from Madrid 
sparked a failed Catalan rebellion in 1640 (63). Catalonia’s gradual loss of power over its 
own domain culminated with the 1714 conquering of Barcelona during the War of 
Spanish Succession (72).  The victor, King Philip V, abolished Catalonia’s governing 
institutions and declared Castilian Spanish the official language of the region (74-76), 
introducing a precedent of suppression of the Catalan language that continued to manifest 
for more than 250 years.  
Although the region has belonged to the Spanish state for over three hundred 
years, Catalans have maintained their own identity. For example, the War of Spanish 
Succession maintains a powerful place in Catalan consciousness: Catalonia’s national 
holiday, La Diada, falls on September 11, the day that Philip V’s armies overran 
Barcelona. El Born Centre Cultural, a monument of preserved ruins from the final battle, 
lies down the street from the regional parliament building in Barcelona. Internationally 
renowned artists Antoni Guadi and Salvador Dali were both native to Catalonia, a 
distinction in which Catalans take pride. Gaudi’s architectural styles feature prominently 
throughout the city of Barcelona, and his crown jewel, the cathedral La Sagrada Família, 
towers over the Catalan capital as one of Europe’s most striking landmarks.  
The average tourist may associate Spain with cultural elements like bullfighting 
and flamenco. But in fact, in Catalonia, parliament banned bullfighting in 2010, with 
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many of the ban’s proponents arguing that the practice was traditionally Spanish – not 
Catalan (Mender). A visitor to Catalonia may instead see the construction of a castell, a 
festival in which hundreds of people form a human tower (Atwood Mason). Walking into 
a prominent square in Barcelona, one may find groups of Catalans dancing Sardana, a 
group dance traditional to the region (Atwood Mason). He or she may be surprised to find 
that the street signs are written not in Spanish, but in Catalan – the first language of more 
than 40 percent of the region’s inhabitants. Catalan has been the main language of 
education in the region since 1983 (Hierro 462), and during the 1992 Barcelona 
Olympics, organizers made Catalan an official language of the games (Hargreaves and 
García Ferrando 82).  
Despite Catalonia’s clear and distinct identity, the Catalan people had generally 
not sought independence until very recently. In Spain’s early years as a democracy in the 
late 1970s, only five percent of Catalans expressed support for an independent state 
(Dowling, “Accounting” 220). Catalan professor of politics Montserrat Guibernau 
describes the first few years of the 2000s as “a time when secessionism was not even 
mentioned” (“Young People’s Expectations,” 112). Yet that trend changed dramatically 
around 2010, leading to the current situation in which separatists control the regional 
government in Barcelona.  
4. The Spanish-Catalan Relationship Through History 
In explaining their support for independence, Catalan separatists often point to the 
disdain they believe Spain has long harbored for Catalonia.  Author Matthew Tree sums 
up this sentiment in a 2010 interview in which he describes the relationship between 
Catalonia and Spain as “two and a half centuries of institutionalized popular rejection, in 
    Mermel 11 
very large areas of Spain, of the very existence of something called Catalonia” (Strubell 
230). This sentiment is well entrenched. For example, Andrew Dowling writes that anti-
Catalan feeling, which he dubs “Anti-Catalanism,” “has its origins in the revolt of the 
Catalans in the seventeenth century and was cemented by the Catalan industrialisation 
and modernisation before much of Spain” (“Catalonia Since the Spanish Civil War,” 
149). During the Civil War of the 1930’s, General Francisco Franco issued a declaration 
revoking Catalonia’s 1932 Statute of Autonomy that had been written during the Second 
Spanish Republic (Sobrequés i Callicó 110-11). This was, in the words of Sobrequés i 
Callicó, “the first indication of what would be the repression of Catalonia” (110). After 
the war, Franco became Spain’s authoritarian head of state. His government forbade 
public use of the Catalan language and rename streets and monuments in Castilian 
(Gade). Francoist opposition to Catalonia stemmed from the ideology’s commitment to 
centralization and Spanish unity – the dictator rationalized his decision to revoke 
Catalonia’s 1932 statute as designed to assure “unity of the Patria,” a necessary action 
given the “liquidation of the regime [the statute] established” (Sobrequés i Callíco 111). 
These ideals also manifested in the Franco regime’s decisions to deny regional autonomy 
and centralize the government in Madrid, in addition to his regime’s push to foster a 
national Spanish identity by actively associating with the Roman Catholic church and 
promoting cultural practices like Flamenco and Bullfighting, which Franco dubbed the 
fiesta nacional  (“national festival”) (Strubell 146). 
After the dictator’s death in 1975, the country began a transition towards 
democracy. The new government aimed to reverse the Francoist traditions of political 
centralization and overt Spanish nationalism. Whereas Franco’s rule had suppressed 
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regional identities, the new Spanish government sought to recognize Spain’s regional and 
cultural differences. The preamble to the Spanish constitution, passed with widespread 
public support in a 1978 national referendum, expresses the intent to “protect all 
Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, of their cultures and 
traditions, and of their languages and institutions” (Congreso de los Diputados). The 
usage of plural in reference to languages, cultures and traditions stands as a clear 
rejection of Franco’s exclusively pro-Castilian ideology. Guibernau echoes this 
observation in “Young People’s Expectations,” stating:  
The radically conservative and centralist character of the brand of Spanish  
 nationalism promoted by the Franco regime was fundamentally questioned by the 
 new Constitution, which not only aspired to transform Spain into a democratic 
 state, but also recognized the existence of nationalities and regions within its 
 territory. (110) 
 
One of the primary methods the constitution employs to achieve this goal is dividing 
Spain into seventeen autonomous communities, a system of governance similar to states 
and provinces in other countries. This system is known as the “Estado de las 
Autonomías” – the “State of Autonomies.” 
 Each of these seventeen communities wrote its own statute of autonomy, a 
document detailing the separation of powers between the community and the central 
government of Madrid. Thus, the introduction of the State of Autonomies made Spain a 
decentralized, federal governmental system. The communities of Catalonia, Galicia and 
the Basque country were each created as a specific acknowledgement of the cultural and 
historical uniqueness of the respective regions, while other autonomous communities like 
La Rioja represented no unique historical or cultural community (Edwards 670). The 
central government in Madrid allowed the unique communities like Catalonia to achieve 
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full autonomy immediately upon the passing of the constitution, while the other 
communities were subject to a five-year waiting period (Guibernau, “Secessionism in 
Catalonia” 375). Sian Edwards details the specific capacities granted to the Catalan 
government by its original statute of autonomy as follows:  
The parliament can legislate in areas where it has exclusive power [ . . . ] These 
 areas include conservation; Catalan civil law, heritage (historic, artistic, scientific) 
 [ . . . ] research, tourism, welfare, transport, agriculture and fishery, culture 
 and sport. Powers are shared in areas such as labour, law, social security, the 
 media, public safety, culture and education. The state has exclusive power in 
 areas such as defense and the armed forces, international relations, immigration, 
 monetary system and the administration of justice. (671) 
 
In summary, the rise of the new democratic government and adoption of the new 
constitution brought about massive changes in the recognition that non-Castilian 
communities received as part of the Spanish state. The change in treatment of the Catalan 
language demonstrates the gravity of these changes. Under the Franco regime, a Catalan 
in Barcelona could be arrested for speaking their native language on the street. Under the 
new democratic government, schoolchildren across Catalonia studied in Catalan.   
Yet despite the drastic and long lasting shifts in Spanish political life brought 
about by the transition, some of Spain’s long-standing questions remained unanswered. 
In “Young People’s Expectations,” Guibernau identifies an inherent tension within Spain: 
on one hand, there exists a desire to maintain national unity, and on the other, the goal of 
allowing proper recognition and self-determination to the autonomous communities 
(110). The 1978 constitution embodies this tension: while it creates the autonomous 
community system and actively acknowledges Spain’s plurality, the document also 
“affirms the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common fatherland of all 
Spaniards’” (Edwards 672). This tension between centralization and recognition of 
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plurality is not purely symbolic, either. In the case of Catalonia, she describes dealings 
between Barcelona and Madrid as “depend[ing] on the intricate working of the 
constitution and the statute of autonomy,” and ultimately calls this system as a 
“confrontational center-periphery model” (672). Edwards notes that the “vagueness” of 
Catalonia’s original statute on the division of financing powers had led to a number of 
conflicts between the Catalan and Spanish governments (673). Edwards’ article was 
printed in 1999, well before the major events discussed in this paper, yet they would 
prove prescient.   
Additionally, and despite the democratic transition’s gains, anti-Catalanism did 
not entirely disappear from society. For example, during the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, 
Catalan was made an official language of the games, and the Catalan flag was displayed 
in an official capacity (Hargreaves and García Ferrando 82). In a paper on Spanish 
reactions to the games, John Hargreaves and Manuel García Ferrando find that 
approximately 40 percent of non-Catalan Spaniards viewed this use of the Catalan flag 
and language as “bad” or “very bad” (82). Writing in 1997, the authors conclude, “this 
response indicates there is a strong antipathy among the population in the rest of Spain to 
attempts to push Catalan nationalism further” (84).  
5. The Early 2000s: Boling Frustration and Discontent 
Tensions continued to build in the years following Hargreaves and García 
Ferrando’s paper. Dowling writes that in the late 1990’s “radically nationalist” elements 
within Catalonia “increasingly evoked the term sovereignty” (“Autonomistes” 187-188). 
In 2000, the conservative party Popular (PP) won control of Spanish parliament, and 
“hardened its discourse of Spanish nationalism [ . . . ] in part [due] to the perception that 
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Catalanist policies were threatening the unity” of Spain (188). Dowling concludes that 
“Spanish-Catalan tension was at its highest between 2003 and 2006, exemplified by the 
emergence of anti-Catalan hostility on the part of Spanish conservatism” (196). As 
evidence, he points to “the acting out of a series of dramatic events before the Spanish 
media,” which included a “boycott of Catalan goods led from Madrid” and the removal 
from office of a military general (196) who implied that the armed forces should be 
mobilized against Catalonia should the region move towards independence (Tremlett, 
“Spain’s old guard”).   
Throughout this same time period, from the 1970s transition to democracy to the 
early 2000s, Catalonia experienced a long-term trend of economic stagnation and 
growing social unrest that traced its roots as far back as the final decades of the Franco 
regime. In his book “Catalonia Since the Spanish Civil War,” Dowling writes that 
Catalonia began to lose much of its economic power and influence over the second half 
of the 20th century (126-127). He summarizes the situation in “Accounting,” stating: 
both before the economic crisis and since, middle-class sectors in Catalan society 
 have seen the erosion of their comparative position. The distribution of wealth in 
 Catalan society has changed only marginally since the death of Franco. 
 Contemporary Catalan society is more heterogeneous than before, where clear 
 class boundaries have tended to erode, with changing patterns of social 
 stratification. (224) 
 
In interviews on the topic of independence, separatists often focus on this long-
term economic decline as a contributing factor to Catalan anxiety and disillusion with 
Spain (Castro; Strubell). Adding to frustrations over this economic decline was the fact 
that Madrid’s economy prospered as Catalonia’s stagnated. Many Catalans believe these 
economic power shifts resulted directly from a deliberate Spanish effort to assure that 
Madrid took Barcelona’s place as Spain’s economic and financial center. Catalan 
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historian Josep M. Muñoz summarizes this argument in asserting that, after the transition 
to democracy, Spain began an “operation [ . . . ] of pivoting the new state around its 
capital, Madrid,” which resulted in turning the capital city “into the center of Spanish 
financial power” (Castro 82). He continues, “[i]t brought about the design and 
articulation of a radial design where everything begins and ends in the center – ‘Great 
Madrid.’ The political mistrust toward the two traditional industrial poles of the peninsula 
– Catalonia and the Basque Country – was clearly implicit in this bet on the ‘radial 
Spain’” (82).  
In summary, during the early 2000s, Catalonia was experiencing considerable 
societal transitions, and thus possessed potential for significant unrest. Adding to this 
climate of upheaval, Catalonia received large numbers of immigrants throughout the 
second half of the 20th century and into the first decade of the 21st century. In the 1950s 
and 60s, many of these immigrants came from poorer regions of Spain (Jeram). Yet 
around the turn of the millennium, foreign immigration skyrocketed, with the number of 
Catalonia’s residents born outside of Spain rising from 2.9 percent to more than 15 
percent between the years 2000 and 2010 (Jeram 231). 
Still, despite the unease that characterizes the history between Spain and 
Catalonia, and the growing social unrest in Catalonia brought about by longstanding 
economic and demographic changes, support for Catalan secession long remained only 
peripheral.  As mentioned, only five percent of Catalans supported independence during 
the late 1970s transition to democracy. The Catalan government supported Spain during 
the 1993 economic crisis and, near the end of the decade, assisted Spanish efforts to join 
the Euro (Guibernau, “Young People’s Expectations” 109). Even in the early 2000s, 
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amidst the climate of cultural tension and economic anxiety, few Catalans supported 
independence. Guibernau describes these years as “a time when secession was not even 
mentioned” (“Young People’s Expectations” 112). Such policy orientations are 
unimaginable today, when approximately half of the Catalan parliament openly supports 
secession from the Spanish state.  
6. The 2006 Statute of Autonomy: Writing and Negotiation 
Perhaps due to the growing Catalan discontent with the region’s state of affairs, 
Catalonia’s 2003 regional parliamentary elections brought about a power shift. Jordi 
Pujol, president of Catalonia since 1980, declined to seek re-election. His party, center-
right nationalist Convergència i Unió (CiU), won its smallest vote share since 1980 
(Álvarez-Rivera). These developments suggest a significant departure from the 
longstanding status quo. Catalans viewed CiU as part of the establishment, to which they 
considered ERC an alternative (Dowling, “Autonomistes” 187-188).  Hargreaves and 
García Ferrando note that Pujol was always careful to assure Spain that his attempts to 
secure autonomy for Catalonia were within the framework of the Spanish constitution 
(84). As CiU fell in popularity, the left-wing and separatist Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya (ERC) rose, winning 16.4 percent of the vote after never breaking 10 percent 
in any prior election since the transition to democracy (Álarvez-Rivera). Whereas Pujol 
emphasized that his requests were designed to work within the Spanish state’s 
framework, ERC’s support for independence presented a stark contrast to this ideology.  
 The new Catalan parliament committed to rewriting Catalonia’s statute of 
autonomy in an effort to address the turbulent conditions facing the region (Colino 277). 
The statute’s reforms primarily aimed to reinforce recognition of Catalonia’s unique 
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identity within the Spanish state, improve financial and economic conditions by 
reexamining Barcelona’s relationship with Madrid, and grant Catalonia greater agency 
both to determine its own affairs and participate in international functions (Requejo 159). 
The decision of the Catalan government – known as the Generalitat - to address its 
grievances through reform of the statute reveals a commitment to working within the 
framework that the Spanish constitution explicitly provides. Furthermore, Catalan 
citizens supported their government’s chosen method of reform: an August 2005 Opina 
Institute survey found that 64.7 percent of Catalans believed it “necessary” to reform the 
statute, and that 75.8 percent expressed optimism that the reforms would lead to 
improvements in Catalan life (Requejo 160). The movement to write the new statute, and 
Catalan citizens’ widespread support of it, demonstrates the lack of support for 
separatism at the time. However, by the process’ conclusion, these attempts at reform 
proved a crucial turning point in convincing many Catalans that the region was powerless 
to further its own interests within the Spanish state and that the relationship with Spain 
was no longer tenable.  
In order for the new statute to become law, it first needed to be written and passed 
in Catalan parliament, then passed in Spanish parliament, and finally put to referendum in 
Catalonia (Colino). Throughout 2005, Catalan parliament negotiated the terms of the new 
statute. Although CiU no longer held control of parliament, the ruling “tripartite” 
coalition of left-wing parties ERC, Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), and 
Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV), did not possess sufficient votes to pass the statute 
on their own, meaning CiU maintained leverage in the bargaining process (Colino 268-
    Mermel 19 
269). CiU and ERC, rivals with opposite positions on the political spectrum, drove the 
negotiations through political posturing and outbidding one another (Colino).  
Of these four parties, PSC, the Catalan affiliate of the Spanish socialist party 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Español, abbreviated PSOE), was only one that was not 
Catalan nationalist. PSOE’s victory in 2004’s national parliamentary elections 
encouraged many Catalans who expected the party to be more receptive than Partido 
Popular (PP) to Catalan attempts at reform (Requejo 159). Yet in negotiations in 
Barcelona, PSC found itself aligned only with PP (Colino 269). PP, Spain’s conservative 
party, is traditionally one of the smallest parties in Catalan parliament and the rival of 
PSOE on the national stage. Nationalist parties’ influence outweighed that of PSC, and, 
accordingly, the statute that passed Catalan parliament on September 30 of 2005 was 
“closer to the nationalists’ preferences, despite [PSC] having opposed many points in it” 
(Colino 269). Given public perceptions of PSOE as more open to negotiation with 
Catalonia than PP, PSC’s alignment with PP in Barcelona foreshadowed the significant 
opposition and controversy that would meet the statute upon its presentation to Spanish 
parliament in Madrid. This potential for conflict was not purely implicit, either: one 
survey in October found that more than 65 percent of Spaniards objected to the statute’s 
description of Catalonia as a “nation,” and that more than 50 percent believed the statute 
“may indeed [a]ffect the unity of Spain” (“Polls show Spaniards oppose aspects of new 
Catalan autonomy statute”). 
That October, debate over the statute began in Madrid (Colino 270). PP opposed 
the statute, believing it “put Spain on the path to dissolution” (“Spain to study greater 
autonomy for Catalonia”). By early November, PP had already challenged the statute as 
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unconstitutional before the Constitutional Court (Colino 270). Nonetheless, negotiations 
continued, and the statute’s provisions suffered during these deliberations. After months 
of negotiations, which scaled back the statute’s scope, Spanish Prime Minister José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero, of PSOE, and CiU leader Artur Mas came to a “global agreement” 
in January 2006, which provided the foundations for the final statute (Colino 272). 
Spanish parliament made slight modifications afterwards before passing the statute in 
March (Colino 273). During his 2004 campaign for prime minister, Zapatero had 
promised to accept any statute that Catalan parliament passed (Guibernau, “Secessionism 
in Catalonia” 381). This position painted a contrast between Zapatero and PP, which 
controlled the government before Zapatero and had favored a “neo-centralist, 
conservative” vision that Catalans opposed (Guibernau, “Secessionism in Catalonia” 
381).  Yet Zapatero’s decision to negotiate with Mas, rather than simply support the 
statute that Catalan parliament had passed, signaled a breaking of this promise.  
The final statute drew detractors from multiple angles. In her book “Goodbye, 
Spain?” Crameri describes the long negotiation process in Madrid as leading to a 
“watered-down statute that removed key clauses on finance and language” (39). She also 
reports that the negotiations relegated the description of Catalonia as a “nation” to the 
preamble, “where it had no legal force” (39). ERC opposed the final statute on these 
grounds and others, believing it did not sufficiently benefit Catalonia (Colino 273-274). 
On the other hand, PP, which had tried to limit the statute’s capacities from the 
beginning, still did not support the final draft and unsuccessfully attempted to veto it 
(Colino 274). These contrasting perceptions of the statute serve to illustrate the 
ideological distance between Catalan nationalists and Spanish conservatives. Catalan 
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voters ultimately approved the statute in a referendum, with 73.9 percent of voters 
approving the reform (Walker). Even then, the referendum drew only lukewarm turnout 
of 48.9 percent, which Crameri attributes to “apathy and frustration among Catalans” 
caused by the grueling negotiation process (“Goodbye, Spain?” 40).  
7. The 2006 Statute of Autonomy: Reforms, Provisions, and Aftermath 
The final version of the statute, as passed in the June referendum, acts in a manner 
similar to a constitution – it details the structure of Catalan parliament and the frequency 
of elections as well as the political and legal rights of citizens. In addition to this role, it 
also serves to define the separations of powers between Barcelona and Madrid. Scholars 
use the term blindaje, Spanish for “shielding,” in referring to the statute’s efforts to 
protect the capacities of the Catalan government from Madrid’s intervention (Castellà 
Andreu 100; Colino 275). Some exclusive powers of the Generalitat include the creation 
of a Catalan High Court of Justice with “authority to unify interpretation of the law in 
Catalonia,” regulation of the agriculture and livestock industries, hydraulic infrastructure 
and housing. These repeated references to exclusively Catalan powers are balanced by 
similarly frequent assurances that the statute aims to work within the boundaries set in the 
Spanish constitution. Additionally, the preamble emphasizes Catalonia’s “solidarity with 
Spain as a whole.” These sections of the statute illustrate the distance between the 
Catalan government’s status quo in 2006, and the situation in 2016 in which separatists 
occupy a majority of the parliamentary seats in Barcelona (Parlament de Catalunya).  
The statute begins by depicting Catalonia as a unique territory within the Spanish 
state. It discusses Catalan history, and speaks of Catalonia’s continued attempts to 
“restore” self-governance that was lost in 1714. The concluding sentences of the 
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preamble define Catalonia as a nation, and describe the statute as an “exercise of the 
inalienable right to self-govern.” Early on, the statute introduces Catalonia’s 
characteristics. Article 6.1 emphasizes the importance and status of the Catalan language, 
deeming it “the language of normal and preferential use in Public Administration,” article 
6.2 follows by assuring “there shall be no discrimination on the basis of use of either of 
the two languages” (referring to both Spanish and Catalan).  Article eight expands on this 
Catalan identity by designating an official flag, anthem, and national holiday of Catalonia 
(Parlament de Catalunya).   
In addition to defining the characteristics of the Catalan nation, the statute also 
enacts specific reforms and policies. Many of the provisions of the statute attempt to 
address specific issues facing Catalonia at the time. For example, as noted, the early 
2000s saw many public confrontations between Spaniards and Catalans borne out of the 
rise of a Spanish nationalism that bristled at expressions of Catalan identity. The statute 
appears to address these tensions by reaffirming Catalonia’s commitment to its unique 
identity. As mentioned, article six outlines Catalonia’s commitment to the Catalan 
language. Article fifty-four mandates that the Generalitat “and other public authorities” 
maintain the recognition of Catalan “historical memory,” described as “a collective 
heritage that bears witness to [Catalonia’s] resistance and struggle for rights and 
democratic freedoms.” Similarly, article 167 declares the Generalitat’s exclusive 
dominion over the “regulation, organization, configuration and preservation of the 
symbols of Catalonia.” Each of these articles mandate, in some form, the Generalitat to 
assure recognition of Catalonia’s uniqueness (Parlament de Catalunya). 
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Catalonia’s economic decline was perhaps the most pressing of the issues 
addressed in the statute’s reforms. As such, the statute devotes an entire title to the 
“funding of the Generalitat.” This title covers the Generalitat’s budget, tax policies, and 
fiscal and financial powers, and spends a fair amount of time detailing the economic 
relationship between Catalonia and Madrid. As one example, article 204 creates a 
Taxation Agency of Catalonia, designed to participate in the federal taxation process 
along with the already existing Taxation Administration of the State. Similarly, Article 
210 creates a “State-Generalitat Joint Economic and Fiscal Affairs Commission,” 
responsible for agreeing to methods of collection and distribution of federal taxes in 
Catalonia (Parlament de Catalunya).  
Finally, the statute attempts to legally assure Catalonia’s self-governance. Article 
222 delegates responsibility for “reform of titles that do not affect relations with the 
state” exclusively to Catalan governmental bodies. Article 223, titled “Reform of the 
other titles,” still delegates “initiative for reform” to the Catalan government. Only after 
approval of these reforms in Catalan parliament does the Spanish government enter into 
the process, as the proposed reform is sent to Madrid for deliberation in the Congress of 
Deputies (Parlament de Catalunya).  
Yet even after more than a year of deliberation and modification through the 
democratic process, the future of the statute remained in doubt. Spain’s Constitutional 
Court agreed to hear PP’s challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, but did not rule 
on it until 2010. This four-year impasse allowed Catalan discontent and frustration to 
fester, as the reform specifically designed to address the region’s problems faced a 
clouded future. During this time period, Dowling writes that “many variables [worked] in 
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favor” of the secessionist movement (“Accounting” 223). These variables included a 
frustration with the political process and power establishment, due in part to the delay of 
the statute as well as growing anxiety over continuing economic upheaval within 
Catalonia that only worsened upon the arrival of the 2007 global financial crisis 
(Dowling “Accounting”). 
Meanwhile, indications of a growing embrace of Catalan identity began to 
manifest. Beginning in 2009, 160 Catalan towns staged mock independence referendums 
in which roughly 700,000 citizens participated (Govan). Also in 2009, numerous 
prominent Barcelona newspapers published a joint editorial titled “La dignidad de 
Catalunya” (“Dignity of Catalonia”). The editorial speaks of Catalan concern that the 
Constitutional Court would cut back the statute, and a “growing irritation [among 
Catalans] of supporting those who consider Catalan identity an impediment on Spain’s 
attempts to achieve a dreamed of and impossible uniformity.” The authors go on to cite 
Catalan grievances towards Spain, declaring “Catalans pay their taxes, contribute welfare 
to the poorer areas of Spain, face economic globalization without receiving the benefits 
[Madrid] does,” and noting that the Catalan language was more widely spoken than many 
official languages of the EU, but that it nonetheless had faced the “obsessive scrutiny” of 
“official Españolismo” (“La dignidad de Catalunya”). 
In continuing the embrace of Catalan identity, in 2010, Catalan parliament banned 
bullfighting, a symbol of Spanish culture and identity particularly associated with 
conservative elements of society and famously championed by Franco as the “fiesta 
nacional,” or “national festival” (Strubell 134-137; 146). In detailing this decision in a 
2010 article for The Guardian, journalist Colm Toíbín writes that the ban “fulfills 
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[Catalan] anxiety to be understood and appreciated throughout the world as a separate 
nation [ . . . ] Most Catalans loathe bullfighting, they view it as part of a strange, dark, 
foreign, Iberian spirit which has sought to encroach upon the modern, European spirit to 
which they feel allegiance.” 
8. The Constitutional Court’s Ruling 
        The Spanish Constitutional Court did not announce its final ruling on the statute 
until June of 20101. The court ruled that the statute’s description of Catalonia as a nation 
carried no legal weight, as the constitution recognized only one nation - Spain 
(Guibernau, “Secessionism in Catalonia” 382). While the court allowed Catalan to 
maintain “preferential status” within the region’s educational system, it forbade the 
language from achieving this distinction in “Catalan public administration” (382). 
Instead, Catalan was only permitted to attain equal status with Castilian in this sphere 
(Tribunal Constitucional de España). Furthermore, the court considered the provision 
calling upon Catalans to master the Catalan language to be of secondary importance to 
Catalans’ constitutional duty to achieve proficiency in Castilian (Guibernau, 
“Secessionism in Catalonia” 382). On the financial front, the court declared Catalonia’s 
attempts to set up its own tax system unconstitutional. The statute’s provision that “the 
                                                        
1 The Constitutional Court holds significant power within Spain’s governmental system. Enrique Guillen 
Lopez details the history and the powers of the court in a 2008 paper for Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review. The Spanish government created the court during the transition to democracy out of a perceived 
need for “constitutional authority to be separated from ordinary judicial power” (2) – an understandable 
desire for a country emerging from four decades of authoritarian rule. The court played an important role in 
securing Spain’s democratic transition, as its “first task in 1981 was to convince a legal and political class 
already influenced by the Franco dictatorship that the constitution was a true legal standard and that [the 
court] was its main defender” (6). Every three years, Spanish parliament selects court magistrates to serve 
nine-year terms, and each party is allowed to nominate a certain number of judges based on their level of 
representation within parliament (4).  This means that “the magistrates are identified immediately with the 
party that supported them [ . . . ] leaving any contested decision by the court open to political attack” (4). 
Guillen Lopez describes the upcoming ruling on the Catalan statute of autonomy as “a critical moment in 
the history of Spain’s constitution” (4). 
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state’s investment in Catalonia should be on a level with the percentage of Catalan GDP 
in relation to the overall Spanish GDP” was deemed constitutional, but Madrid was not 
legally obligated to fulfill this provision (382). Finally, the court rejected the statute’s 
efforts to create a Catalan Court of Justice, positing that the creation of courts was outside 
of the powers granted to autonomous communities (Tribunal Constitucional de España 
19-20).  
The court’s official pronouncement of the ruling discusses all articles challenged 
by PP – not just those the court chose to strike down. These portions of the proclamation 
reveal telling information. For example, PP challenged the wording of the Catalan 
statute’s clause proclaiming an “inalienable right to self-government,” on the grounds 
that this right stems not from autonomous communities, but from the national 
constitution, “the foundation for which is the indivisible and single Spanish nation” 
(Tribunal Constitucional de España 6). PP also objected to the statute’s reference to 
Catalan “citizens,” using the rationale that the word “may only be applied to Spaniards 
insofar as they are the only holders of national sovereignty” (7). Further, PP challenged 
the statute’s creation of the Generalitat-State bilateral commission “for being the 
procedural embodiment of the principle of bilateralism” (25).  
Although the court upheld each of these three articles, PP’s arguments against 
them and others demonstrate the profound ideological differences between the Catalan 
mainstream and Spanish conservatism. Each article represents a Catalan attempt to 
achieve a degree of autonomy and recognition as a distinct entity within the Spanish 
state. PP balked at these proposals due to its apprehension that recognition and expression 
of Catalan uniqueness threatened the unity of Spain. The conflict between a peripheral 
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community’s attempts at achieving recognition and centralist efforts to maintain and 
promote national unity has manifested itself throughout Spanish history. While the court 
upheld the majority of the statute’s specific provisions, it appears to side with PP on this 
specific symbolic issue, as the ruling “refer[s] eight times to the ‘indissoluble unity of 
Spain’ (Dowling, “Catalonia Since the Spanish Civil War” 155). This tension informed 
much of the debate over the Statute of Autonomy, and continues to present in the larger 
debate over Catalan independence that continues today.   
More narrowly, common Catalan grievances appear in both PP’s challenge and 
the court’s decision. Catalans often protest that the central government in Madrid does 
not respect or acknowledge the country’s diverse cultural makeup, instead opting only to 
recognize and celebrate a single, narrowly defined Spanish – i.e., Castilian - identity. 
PP’s challenges to Catalonia’s declaration of self-governance and Catalan citizenship 
support this argument, as do the challenges to the status of the Catalan language and the 
definition of Catalonia as a nation, both of which the court modified.  PP also objected to 
Catalonia’s attempts to improve its financial standing within Spain and to achieve greater 
autonomy over its legal affairs, and the court sided with the conservatives on both 
accounts. Ultimately, these decisions lend credence to the common Catalan argument that 
many in Madrid remain committed to centralist policies and are reluctant to allow 
autonomous communities control their own affairs.   
9. Media and Political Reactions to the Constitutional Court Ruling 
            The court’s ruling featured prominently in Spanish news upon its announcement. 
Editorials appeared in newspapers across the country with a wide range of political 
orientations. This section discusses more than thirty of these media reactions. As will be 
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demonstrated, many commentators framed the issue as carrying profound implications 
for the efficacy of the Spanish constitutional system. These interpretations serve as a case 
study through which the larger debate over Catalan independence can be better 
understood, as the commentators’ arguments reveal ideological disagreements within 
Spain that provide the context for the current situation. 
         Madrid based El País, a politically moderate newspaper and the largest one in 
Spain, predicted that the ruling would electorally strengthen PP, CiU and ERC (“Aval El 
Estatut”). They reasoned that the court’s proclamation that portions of the statute were 
unconstitutional fit PP’s rhetoric about Catalonia threatening Spanish unity, while CiU 
and ERC could argue that the decision validated their characterization of Spain as stingy 
and intransigent. El País’ characterization of the issue demonstrates how the ruling only 
added to already boiling conflict between Spanish conservatives and Catalanists. 
Nonetheless, El País initially downplayed the importance of the ruling, writing that 
“neither side should consider the ruling a statement on the viability of the Spanish 
constitution [ . . . ] neither those who see sovereignty in Catalonia’s future, nor those who 
objected to the statute out of a belief that it affected Spain’s unity” (“Aval El Estatut”). 
           José María Brunet of Barcelona’s daily newspaper La Vanguardia – traditionally 
associated with the moderate Catalan nationalism of CiU - issued a mixed reaction to the 
ruling, titled “Una sentencia para salvar los muebles.” The headline declares that the 
ruling “saved” the main parts of the statute, but the introductory paragraph modifies this 
position by nonetheless noting that the ruling rejected important parts of the statute. 
Brunet describes the ruling as a “doble valoracíon,” roughly translated to a “double edged 
sword,” using the court’s treatment of Catalonia’s definition as a nation as an example – 
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the court allowed the term “nation” to stay in the statute, but relegated it to trivial status 
by denying its legal force. As the editorial continues, Brunet departs somewhat from this 
neutral tone, using strong language that depicts Spain as hostile to Catalonia. For 
example, he describes Spanish conservatives as “assaulted by fear” over the “supposed 
discrimination of Spanish speakers in Catalonia.” He also laments that the ruling “puts at 
risk [Catalan] linguistic immersion,” (emphasis mine). For clarity, this indicates that 
Brunet supports Catalan linguistic immersion, and does not like the way the ruling treats 
it (Brunet, “Una sentencia para salvar los meubles”).  
           Victor Ferreres Comella, also of La Vanguardia, is similarly measured in his 
criticisms of the ruling in his article “Leamos la Sentencia.” He notes that the legal 
classes within Spain were long aware that many of the statute’s provisions were 
unconstitutional and were unlikely to survive the court’s scrutiny, and criticizes legal 
experts for not effectively communicating these obstacles to Catalan politicians and 
therefore fostering unrealistic expectations for the statute. Yet his harshest criticisms 
target the purveyors of what he sees as “gross manifestations of anti-Catalanism,” the 
examples of which he cites as the boycott of Catalan goods and a PP-led petition 
supporting that the Catalan statute be put to referendum in all of Spain. These are the 
issues that inform his lamentations that “the worst defects of our country have appeared 
during the process” (Ferreres Comella). 
            El Mundo, a Spanish paper known for its conservative orientations, positions 
itself against the statute, arguing that the court’s ruling did not go far enough in limiting 
Catalan capacities. The paper describes the statute as “chang[ing] the state” and, rather 
than discussing the ways in which the ruling limited the Generalitat’s competencies, 
    Mermel 30 
instead focuses on the fact that the court upheld most of the article’s provisions. They 
write, “the statute, [which] has changed the configuration of the state to grant [Catalonia] 
dimensions of self-government unknown until now, has overcome con nota alta the 
court’s examination.” “Con nota alta” literally translates to “with high note,” essentially 
meaning the court gave the statute a ringing or clear endorsement (“El ‘Estatut’ que 
cambia el estado pasa el filtro del TC”).  
            Other conservatives opposed the Catalan statute, but supported the ruling’s 
treatment of it. For example, in an editorial for conservative new organization ABC, José 
María Carrascal welcomes the ruling and issues a scathing critique of Catalans and the 
Spanish governmental system. He argues, “since we adopted the state of autonomies, it 
has done nothing but become more expensive,” citing Catalans efforts to pursue further 
autonomy within the system as a “suicidal path that will bring emptiness to the state.” He 
thanks the court for “not becoming the first saboteurs of the constitution, which they are 
charged with defending.” He does not limit his criticisms simply to Catalans’ political 
views – he describes Catalans as “never happy, because they want everything,” asserts 
they “are always asking for more and more,” and refers to Catalan indignation over the 
ruling as a “nationalist riot.” These characterizations serve as an example of stereotypes 
of Catalans as greedy and selfish, which Crameri states are common in Spain (Crameri, 
“Goodbye, Spain?”). Interestingly, his depiction of Catalans as “asking for more and 
more” from Spain depicts the Spanish state as the holder of sovereignty – just as PP 
argued was the case in the challenge to the statute (Carrascal).   
While journalists and politicians reacted to the statute with varying degrees of 
opposition and support, Catalans responded with widespread outrage. Prominent Catalan 
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nationalists – including politicians, legal experts, professors and journalists - gave voice 
to Catalan grievances in interviews and essays referencing the ruling, in which several 
common stances consistently appear. First, they argue that the Spanish decision to cut 
back the statute ignored the officially expressed will of the Catalan people, and therefore 
offended democratic sensibilities. For example, Professor Joan Ramon Resina declares, 
“It is incredible that a court [ . . . ] cut back on a Statute that was passed in Spanish and 
Catalan parliaments and approved in a referendum in Catalonia. The people won’t even 
be given the right to approve the changes. All in all it makes a mockery of democracy” 
(Strubell 62). Resina also calls the Constitutional Court “a court deprived of all 
legitimacy,” echoing a common argument found in interviews of Catalanists (Castro; 
Strubell). Another argument depicted the ruling as a clear indication that Spain had put an 
end to the project of decentralization, begun in the late 1970s during the transition to 
democracy and embedded in the State of Autonomies. Jurist Alfons López Tena laments 
that “this sentence marks the end of self-government and puts an end to any speculation 
regarding the possibility of our country progressing within the Spanish state [ . . . ] We 
are in entirely in their hands” (Strubell 44).  
Catalonia’s two most prominent political leaders at the time also expressed their 
anger over the ruling. CiU leader and eventual Catalan president Artur Mas’ echoes 
López Tena, remarking that the ruling indicated that the “constitutional pact has reached 
its limits” (“A nationality, not a nation”). Catalonia’s then-president, José Montilla, states 
in an interview with left-wing Catalan newspaper El Periódico that “the practical effects 
of the changes will probably be small, but the important parts are the political and 
emotional effects. The statute is a symbol [ . . .  The ruling] is an aggression that does not 
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affect one article or another, but rather the dignity of [Catalonia].” Montilla then 
implicitly refers to a common argument of PP, declaring that the ruling “debilitates 
Spanish unity,” his rationale being that it “does a big favor to [Catalan] separatists” 
(Hernàndez). While PP believes allowing Catalonia too much autonomy threatens 
Spanish unity, Montilla believes that a failure to properly recognize Catalonia is what 
truly hurts Spain.  
 Montilla continues this focus on the more symbolic, rather than practical, 
implications of the ruling in a different interview with author Toni Strubell, in which he 
states that Catalan indignation over the court ruling resulted from “the lack of respect that 
has been shown for the democratic process that we followed” (Strubell 50), referring to 
the statute’s passage by democratically elected members of Catalan parliament, 
negotiation and subsequent passage in Madrid, and the June 2006 referendum. Catalan 
newspaper Diari de Girona makes similar points to Montilla in its report on the court’s 
ruling, noting that while the court approved most of the statute, it “cut some of the most 
symbolic aspects” of the statute, including language capacities (“El Constitucional tomba 
14 articles de l’Estatut”).  
Popular reaction in Catalonia was equally strong and negative. Montilla called for 
the demonstration protesting the court’s ruling, to be held on July 10, 2010 (“A 
nationality, not a nation”). An article published a week before the demonstration by 
conservative news organization La Razón depicts Catalans as largely indifferent towards 
the statute and uninterested in the protest (“Del Estatut sólo nos interesan las perras”). 
However, on the day of the protest, more than one million filled Barcelona’s streets to 
march under the banner “we are a nation, we decide.”  
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Many Spanish media outlets reacted negatively to the Catalan demonstration. For 
example, ABC journalists Anguera and Rovira note that the banners and the slogans of 
the march did not mention the court’s ruling, even though this was the protests’ 
ostensible purpose. Instead, they claim in their headline that the event was “a massive 
pro-independence march.” They also describe the demonstration as “characterized by 
disorganization,” and refer to groups of “nationalist militants” who allegedly participated. 
The video accompanying the article on ABC’s website shows a man carrying a flag pole 
with Catalonia’s La Senyera on one side and the Dutch tricolor on the other – a clear 
expression of support for the Dutch national soccer team, which was set to face Spain in 
the World Cup final the next day (Anguera and Rovira).  
While Catalan and conservative newspapers generally have clear and defined 
stances on the court ruling, El País editorials present an interesting mix of reactions 
between those for and against the ruling. For example, in “Cataluña, sin ‘Estatut,” José 
María Ridao declares that the ruling has brought about “the most severe crisis the 1978 
system has crossed.” He emphasizes that, “in a democratic system, political legitimacy 
comes from votes [ . . . ] all these different interpretations [of the statute] are irrelevant if 
they do not result in something that can be approved by the polls” – the implication being 
that the statute, as modified by the court, is not acceptable for Catalans because they did 
not have the opportunity to approve it.  Ridao further argues that the process “has not 
concluded with a cut back text, however with something much worse: the absence of a 
clear norm that governs Catalonia with agreement and legal right” (Ridao, “Cataluña, Sin 
Estatut”). 
    Mermel 34 
However, Antonio Elorza of El País is less sympathetic to Catalans in “Cataluña: 
la fractura.” He alludes to 1968 negotiations between the Czech Republic and the Soviet 
Union, unfavorably comparing Catalans to Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev in their 
intransigence. Elorza writes that Catalans viewed “minor alterations of the original text 
[as] ‘an attack’” and that they considered “every discordant opinion [ . . . ] an attack on 
democracy from Spanish centralism.” He describes this as creating “an extremely 
dangerous scenario for everyone,” which he believes “had its origin in Zapatero’s 
senseless 2003 proclamation  [that he would unconditionally support a Catalan statute . . . 
] from here surged a desire to exercise Catalan power, that the Madrid courts would 
validate [ . . . ] without the demands of the Spanish constitution taken into account” 
(Elorza, “Cataluña: la fractura”). In another article for El País, titled “El Futuro de 
España,” Elorza criticizes Catalans for failing to consider “what could occur to the state 
after the changes initiated in 2004,” as “Spain has been erased from the Catalanist 
political horizon, save for as an obstacle or an entity historically incapable of 
understanding the uniqueness of Catalonia and its capacity for suffering.” He also holds 
that Catalans who argue for a federalist relationship with Spain do not truly understand 
federalism, as exemplified by Germany and the United States (Elorza, “El Futuro de 
España”).  
Ultimately, however, the most consistent issue explored in the media reactions is 
the ruling’s implications for the constitution. Specifically, the commentators discuss the 
ruling’s ramifications for the divisions of power between Spain and Catalonia as well as 
the conceptual understandings of the Spanish state, both of which are embedded within 
the document and, more narrowly, the State of Autonomies. These characterizations 
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appear in the aforementioned reactions of Mas, Lopéz Tena, and Carrascal, among others. 
Many other journalists employ this approach, including Carme Chacon Piqueras and 
Felipe González Marquéz of El País. The two believe “the problem continues to be in 
PP’s resistance to recognizing the diversity of Spain and in the obstinacy of Catalan 
sectors that magnify the frictions and minimize the historically gained advances.” 
Expanding on this point, they hold that “the path traveled by our democracy has 
overcome two resistances: That of the centralists, who consider the process a debilitation 
of the Spanish nation and an affront to Castilian. And that of the separatists, who prevent 
the advances like a deception and magnify each friction like an offense to Catalonia.” 
They do stress that Catalonia possesses the “best level of self-government” within the 
Spanish decision, thanks to the 1978 constitution as well as the two statutes of autonomy 
in 1979 and 2006. Yet, the bulk of their criticisms target Spanish conservatives. They 
expound, “the constitution and the statutes [ . . . ] are the norms that permit the 
coexistence of diverse identities in the same space and with the same citizenship rules [ . . 
. ] PP express[es] a pre-constitutional vision of the state. They deny the very notion of 
self-government.” The authors also criticize the court ruling for, in their view, exhibiting 
a “lack of recognition of Catalan diversity in the Spanish reality.” Finally, they conclude, 
“we must demonstrate that these 30 years of coexistence and self-government have not 
been a parentheses, rather the beginning of a new stage. We must highlight that the 
constitution of 1978 was a starting point and a meeting point, that the conception of Spain 
as a ‘nation of nations’ strengthens us all” (Chacon Piqueras and González Márquez). 
This examination of the statute’s implications to the Spanish constitutional system 
routinely appears in the reactions to the statute. Numerous journalists, particularly 
    Mermel 36 
Catalans, maintain that the court casts doubt on the long-term viability of the State of 
Autonomies. For example, José María Ridao examines the ruling’s implications for the 
constitutional system in a second El País editorial, entitled “Era innecesario el Estatut?” 
Ridao refers to Zapatero’s campaign pledge as leading to seven years of “senseless 
bidding between communities, putting in question the autonomous system and ruining the 
prestige of the institutions, the political parties and the political class involved in this 
adventure.” He argues that, after this period and the court ruling, “if there were 
deficiencies [with the State of Autonomies] that could have been corrected, today they 
have multiplied.” Ridao also appears to question just how useful the autonomous system 
can be in easing some of the more endemic tensions in Spanish society, writing, “no list 
of competencies nor any system for financing them will ever be able to fully account for 
what is a nation [ . . . ] and what is not.” Such an interpretation paints a bleak future for 
the State of Autonomies, as it suggests the existence of a fundamental conflict within 
Spain that legal institutions are unable to solve (Ridao, “Era innecesario el Estatut?”).   
Writing in La Vanguardia, José María Brunet criticizes the court for similar 
reasons, arguing it “has succumbed to the temptation to make a restrictive jurisprudence 
in respect to the territorial issue” (i.e., the State of Autonomies). He also characterizes the 
court in a manner similar to how Catalans often characterize Spaniards in general, 
claiming that the ruling resulted from “the fear that the statute carries a secessionist 
pathology” and that “the court has been [ . . . ] sensitive to the bombardment of news 
about the supposed risk that Castilian runs in Catalonia” (emphasis mine). He sums up 
his argument in his headline: “the court leaves Catalonia dependent on the margins of 
negotiation of each moment; a ruling full of prejudices and castles in the air.” Here, 
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“castles in the air” is roughly equivalent to the English phrase “house of cards;” in other 
words, the ruling put Catalonia in a tenuous position (Brunet, “El TC deja a Catalunya”). 
Miguel Aparicio of El Periódico makes a similar argument. He acknowledges that 
the court did leave parts of the statute in tact, but suggests, “the impactful element of the 
sentence has been to slow, when it doesn’t paralyze, the impulse of transformation and, 
where possible, eliminate the innovation of the state model that the statute supported.” He 
also references a declaration by Zapatero that the court’s judgment set “the autonomist 
ceiling” and argues that this ceiling was actually reached before the statute. He laments 
that Catalonia was not able to work an alternative statute within this ceiling (Aparaico).  
          In a column for El Periódico entitled “España tiene un problema” (Spain has a 
Problem), Miquel Roca i Junyent also maintains that the ruling poses significant 
questions about the future of Spain’s constitutional system. In support of his assertion 
that the ruling “has closed a door and with it an entire historical age,” he contends that the 
situation brought about by the ruling “was not foreseen” during the writing of the 
constitution in 1978. In his view, that was a time of hope and progress, whereas the ruling 
represents a regression. In his words, “the ideological foundation of the sentence is the 
conviction that too much was ceded [during the transition], and now they are trying to 
recapture what was lost.” Roca sees the ruling as affecting all of Spain, not just Catalonia. 
He laments that “the spirit of the transition has ended,” and that Spain appears “afraid of 
its own diversity and plurality.” He calls on Spain to reconsider its pacts with its 
autonomous communities that allow for coexistence within the state (Roca i Junyent).  
In keeping with this theme, a commentary appearing in the Basque newspaper El 
Diario Vasco compares the Catalan statute to Basque attempts to achieve further 
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autonomy. It also recalls that the writing of the statute began during a time when 
Zapatero had advocated “a process of re-adaptation of the autonomous state” before 
noting that, after the ruling, Zapatero declared the end of this process. The article 
explains that non-nationalists see the ruling as the court drawing a line, based on the 
constitution, that statutes of autonomy “cannot cross,” while nationalists (in this case 
referring to regional nationalists – Catalans and Basques both included) believe the 
“whole process surrounding the statute shows a regressive tendency in regards to the 
statue of autonomies” (“La Sentencia Del Estatut”). Like the commentators mentioned 
above, the regional nationalists described in this piece fear the court ruling’s implications 
for the State of Autonomies.  
               The characterization of the court ruling as carrying implications for the viability 
of the State of Autonomies was so widespread that even Prime Minister Zapatero himself 
explores this topic in an essay published in La Vanguardia. In contrast to the previously 
addressed commentators, Zapatero declares a sense of optimism and affirms his faith in 
the Spanish system. He speaks positively of both Catalonia and the court, while also 
rejecting conservative attacks on the Catalan reform (as a reminder, Zapatero belongs to 
left-wing party PSOE). He emphasizes that the statute still brings about substantial 
reforms, writing that it “significantly amplifies the self government of Catalonia in the 
constitutional frame.” Reminiscent of his campaign promise that Catalonia be allowed to 
rewrite its statute and that he would support any statute Catalan parliament passed, he 
writes, “it seemed important to me, to preserve our coexistence, a majority expression of 
political will must be respected [ . . . ] this must also extend [ . . . ] to the court ruling.” A 
positive, upbeat tone permeates his essay, such as in his assertion that “this is a good 
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occasion to look with normalcy to the future, that of Spain and of Catalonia. A future 
together with natural coexistence based in the compromise with constitutional Spain, with 
democratic Spain, of which the political identity of Catalonia forms an inalienable part” 
(Rodríguez Zapatero). 
Similarly, an ABC article featuring interviews with autonomous community 
presidents from around Spain discusses this matter. These presidents’ characterizations 
are generally similar to Zapatero’s – they approve of the ruling, and believe the 
affirmation of the State of Autonomies that it presents benefits Spain. For example, 
Galicia’s PP president Alberto Núñez Feijóo maintains that the articles the court struck 
down were so treated because they “broke the pact” laid out in the 1978 constitution. 
When asked if he believes that that statute gives Catalonia a “situation of privilege,” he 
responds that “any autonomous community can, respecting the limits framed in the 
sentence, aspire to obtain [ . . . ] the same levels of self-government as Catalonia” 
(emphasis mine). Marcelino Iglesias, PSOE president of Aragón, similarly states, “the 
only thing that the ruling has done is confirm how Catalonia’s statute fits [ . . . ] in the 
model of the state.” The presidents generally agree that the statute does not grant 
Catalonia a place of privilege within the Spanish state, and that all Spaniards have equal 
rights under the Spanish constitution. Additionally, they hold that the court’s ruling must 
be respected – a clear contrast with many Catalans, including the aforementioned 
Professor Resina, who criticized the court as illegitimate (“Queda Claro que sólo hay una 
nación: España”). 
Jorge de Esteban, president of the editorial board for El Mundo, was one non-
Catalan journalist who disapproved of the court’s ruling. However, de Esteban took this 
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position because he believed the court had not gone far enough in scaling back 
Catalonia’s autonomy. After asserting that the July 10 march in Barcelona “was not 
against the ruling, but against the constitution, which no longer governs in Catalonia 
since the passage of the statute,” de Esteban discusses the implications of the statute’s 
ruling for the rest of Spain. He laments that the debate over the statute has brought about 
a political crisis not seen since the civil war, and criticizes the Constitutional Court for 
allowing Catalonia too much autonomy. He declares, “the autonomy conceded in 
[Catalonia’s] 1979 statute has now become sovereignty,” and calls the new Catalan 
statute “not a statute, [but] an embryo of a constitution.” He also refers to “Catalan 
particularity and its danger to the unity of Spain.” Towards the end of his piece, he 
predicts that the statute “will be a permanent threat for the judicial and constitutional 
security of Spain.” Finally, he declares, “the state of autonomies, as it has functioned 
until now, now practically does not exist” (de Esteban). De Esteban’s views echo those of 
his newspaper as a whole, as El Mundo described the statute as “changing the state” on 
30 June (“El ‘Estatut’ que cambia el estado”). 
            An article by J. Casquero in La Nueva España, a newspaper from the autonomous 
community of Asturias, also addresses these issues through interviews with local jurists 
and professors. One, Raul Bocanegra, says that Catalans do not want independence, but 
does contend “what interests them is bilateralism, they want special treatment in their 
relations with Spain [ . . . ] they won’t accept federalism, either, because Catalonia wants 
to be more than the rest of the autonomous communities.” Political scientist Óscar 
Rodríguez Buznego reflects, “the [July 10] protest will serve to remind us that we face a 
very complex and serious problem. The Catalan question will occupy a place of 
    Mermel 41 
preference in the current politics for some time. The tension around it will grow” 
(Casquero). 
Rodríguez Buznego’s prediction proved correct. As previously addressed, in the 
years following 2010, support for independence surged in Catalonia. Observers came to 
view Spanish opposition to the statute as a significant turning point that contributed to 
this change. In his 2014 article “Accounting,” Dowling writes that the ruling “gave a 
great impetus to the movement for Catalan independence, with one survey soon after 
showing majority support for separation from Spain for the first time ever” (155). In a 
publication from the same year (“Young People’s Expectations”), Guibernau lists the 
legal challenge to the statute among three primary catalysts for the increase in separatist 
sentiment (112).  
References to the statute’s importance in the debate over Catalan independence 
likewise appear in the Spanish media. In 2014 alone, multiple El País editorials 
addressed how the statute affected the relations between Catalonia and Spain. In one, 
journalist Tomas De La Quadra-Salcedo criticizes both those for and against 
independence. The title of his piece translates into “Impasse and Victimhood.” “Impasse” 
refers to “those who don’t want to change anything” in order to accommodate Catalan 
attempts at reform, while “victimization” describes Catalans “who have decided that the 
time has passed to look for solutions” within the Spanish state, and therefore have 
committed to pursuing independence. He presents the statute as an example of these two 
differing viewpoints, in which Catalans had no intention of breaching the constitution in 
approving the statute, but the Constitutional Court was simply doing its job when it 
issued its ruling striking the statute down – not assaulting democracy. De la Quadra-
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Salcedo believes that both sides are at fault for the state of affairs, declaring, “the truth is 
that the Spanish territorial model  [ . . . ] can give recognition to the wishes of the Catalan 
people, without upsetting or making unviable the essence” of the constitutional system 
(De La Quadra-Salcedo).  In a different editorial, Álex Grijemlo presents an alternative 
interpretation. Whereas De La Quadra-Salcedo insists that Catalans can achieve reform 
within the Spanish constitutional system, Grijemlo argues that those who discuss how 
Catalonia can “fit” into Spain ignore Catalonia’s distinct and unique identity within the 
Spanish state (Grijemlo).  
In another El País editorial from October of the same year, Javier Pérez Arroyo 
describes the ruling as leading to a crisis that has not yet reached its conclusion, and 
describes PP as the only winner – as evidenced by their victories in the 2011 national 
elections. On the other hand, he contends that in Catalonia, the ruling led to no winners – 
only losers. He laments that Catalonia is “without a territorial constitution and without 
perspective that it can be recaptured. Without political integration of Catalonia in Spain 
that was judicially ordained and widely accepted by the citizens of Catalonia as well as 
the rest of Spain, we lack a territorial constitution. This is the state of affairs” (Pérez 
Arroyo). 
In April 2015, five months after 80 percent of participating Catalans voted for 
independence in a mock referendum, prominent PP politician Esperanza Aguirre 
suggested in an interview that opposing the statute might have been an error in judgment 
(Culla i Clarà). This statement illustrates how important the controversy around the 
statute proved in increasing support for independence. Responding to Aguirre’s statement 
in El País, Catalan journalist Joan B. Culla i Clarà argues that PP’s error was not in 
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voting against the statute, “which would have been perfectly normal and legal in a 
democracy.” Rather, he criticizes PP for demonizing the statute and employing 
“apocalyptic” rhetoric against it, citing such declarations as “Spain is on the border of the 
abyss” and that “the new statute is rotten to the core, and nothing can clean it.” Culla i 
Clarà also ponders whether or not PP’s vote against the statute was indeed an error. He 
contends PP’s decision became a blessing for Catalan separatists, as their support 
quadrupled, but he considers PP’s opposition disastrous for those who wished to “fit the 
Catalan national reality within a multinational Spanish state.” Culla i Clarà’s description 
of events presents PP’s opposition to the statute as a self-fulfilling prophecy. He argues 
that the resistance and eventual gutting of the statute forced Catalans to realize that, 
“within the constitution, only an autonomous, regional and marginalized Catalonia could 
fit.” This, Culla i Clarà believes, “pushed moderate [Catalan] nationalism to radicalism” 
(Culla i Clarà). 
            Later in the same year, Agustín Ruiz Robledo wrote an editorial in El País 
presenting a different point of view. He notes that the “idea” that the court’s ruling 
against the statute “was an attack on democracy and a rupture of the pact between 
‘Congress’ and ‘Catalonia,’ [ . . . ] is widespread. But few [have admitted] that the statute 
was, in reality, an amendment to the constitution” (emphasis mine). He criticizes Catalan 
nationalists for claiming to represent the will of the Catalan people, suggesting that it 
only appears this way because the nationalists are most vocal. He also argues that 
Catalonia’s linguistic laws deliberately favor Catalan at the expense of Castilian. The 
extent of his opposition to Catalan nationalism becomes clear in his comparison of 
Catalan nationalists to Italian fascists under Mussolini. He opens his piece by musing, “I 
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believe it was Italo Calvino that said that fascism started to win in Italy when a democrat 
stayed silent while a fascist gave a speech on a train.” Later, he refers to a 1984 political 
confrontation featuring Jordi Pujol as Catalan nationalism’s “march on Rome” (Ruiz 
Robledo).  
10. Takeaways From the Commentary 
The studied commentators consistently choose to depict the court’s ruling on the 
statute as a final, definitive determination on the long term efficacy of the 1978 
constitution and the “State of Autonomies” – the project of decentralization embedded 
within the constitution. The commentators exhibit a wide range of positions on these 
issues. Some conservatives, like Carrascal and de Esteban, maintain that the system gives 
too much autonomy to Spain’s peripheral regions like Catalonia. De Esteban specifically 
blames the ruling for contributing to the decentralization of Madrid’s power. He contends 
that the statute presents a “permanent threat to the judicial and constitutional security of 
Spain,” and maintains that “the state of autonomies [ . . . ] no longer exists.” Carrascal 
takes a different approach, praising the court for halting the progress of Catalan 
autonomy that he believes “brings emptiness to the [Spanish] state.” He credits the court 
for modifying the statute and therefore not becoming “saboteurs of the constitution.” 
Although they draw different conclusions, both Carrascal and de Esteban agree that the 
viability of Spain’s constitution was on the line in the court ruling, and that Catalonia’s 
attempts at achieving autonomy were the reason for this situation. The ideological 
distance between conservatives like Carrascal and de Esteban, fearful of the loss of 
Spanish unity, and the Catalan public, is striking. Carrascal and de Esteban dislike the 
ruling because they believed it allowed Catalonia too much autonomy, while more than 
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one million Catalans took to the streets to protest the extent to which the ruling restricted 
their autonomy.  
There are numerous instances of commentators deliberately framing the issue as a 
crucial, if not final, judgment on the State of Autonomies, in addition to Carrascal and de 
Esteban. They are also found in Roca i Junyent’s assertion that “the spirit of the transition 
has ended;” in Chacon Piqueras and González Márquez’ appeal that “we must 
demonstrate that these 30 years of coexistence and self-government have not been a 
parentheses, rather the beginning of a new stage;” Ridao’s assertion that “if there were 
problems [with the State of Autonomies] that could have been corrected, today they have 
multiplied;” and referrals by a wide range of commentators to the ruling’s implications 
on the “pact” that defines the relationship between Catalonia and Spain. For example, 
Galicia’s president Núñez Feijóo praises the ruling for defining the extent of the 
constitutional “pact,” whereas Catalan politician Artur Mas laments that the 
“constitutional pact [had] reached its limits. Núñez Feijóo and Mas draw a similar 
conclusion. The difference between them is that Núñez Feijóo approves of the situation 
brought about by the court ruling, whereas Mas does not. 
Even Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero casts himself in this camp, endorsing the 
ruling as a successful exercise of the Spanish constitutional process, as it simultaneously 
granted Catalonia an unprecedented level of self-governance while also affirming the 
position of the Constitutional Court. Zapatero outlines these Catalan improvements in 
self-governance by carefully listing the competencies the Generalitat has gained, and 
ultimately contends that the ruling benefits both Catalonia and Spain, setting a framework 
for a “joined future of natural coexistence based in compromise.”  
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These interpretations shed light on why Catalans warmed to the idea of 
independence in the years following the ruling. Roca i Junyent’s assertion that “the spirit 
of the transition ha[d] ended” is powerful. “The transition” refers to Spain’s transition to 
democracy, which brought about a direct rejection of Franco’s centralist and pro-
Castilian ideology. If the transition’s goals of political devolution and its values of mutual 
respect and coexistence could not be pursued any further, then Catalans were powerless 
to improve their standing within the Spanish state. Therefore, those unsatisfied with 
Catalonia’s position within Spain as of the summer of 2010 naturally turned towards 
supporting independence.  
The context of Spanish history allows for Catalan interpretations of the ruling as a 
clear indication that Spain refuses to recognize and appreciate its own plurality, and that 
any ostensible attempts to endorse a “plural Spain” fell well short of appropriately doing 
so. Catalans routinely invoke this argument in the general debate over independence 
(Castro, Strubell). The arguments of conservatives like Carrascal and de Esteban only 
affirm that there is no middle ground to be had between the two sides: while Catalans 
believe their level of autonomy is insufficient, Carrascal and de Esteban believe the court 
ruling allowed too much autonomy to Catalonia and therefore poses an existential threat 
to Spain. Thus, it can be said that Catalans favor a specific definition of the Spanish state 
as a pluralistic collection of different nationalities, or a “nation of nations” in the words 
of Chacon Piqueras and González Márquez. Evidence for this preference appears in the 
Catalan enthusiasm for Zapatero’s 2004 campaign, which openly endorsed a “plural 
Spain,” in contrast to the strongly Spanish nationalist PP government of the early 2000s 
(Guibernau, “Secessionism in Catalonia” 381).  
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Given the above, the negative reactions of Catalan commentators to the court 
ruling indicate a belief that the ruling defined the Spanish state in a manner more similar 
to the one that Carrascal and de Esteban, and PP, favor – centralist and pro-Castilian, a 
vision ostensibly rejected by the 1978 constitution. Consider Roca i Junyent’s argument 
that “the ideological foundation of the sentence is the conviction that too much was ceded 
[during the transition], and now they are trying to recapture what was lost.” Similarly, El 
Diario Vasco reports that regional nationalists (both Catalan and Basque) viewed the 
ruling as indicative of “a regressive tendency in regards to the state of autonomies.” To 
understand the significance of this quote, it must be reiterated that the implementation of 
the State of Autonomies was one of the key innovations of the 1978 constitutional 
system. If the project begun in 1978 had reached its end, as Mas, Roca i Junyent and 
others argue, and Catalans were unhappy with the vision of Spain embodied in the court’s 
ruling, then they had no hope of advancing their position within the Spanish state and 
therefore had no choice but to leave Spain altogether. 
 In this sense, the disagreements over the ruling serve as a proxy for the conflict 
over the entire Spanish constitutional system.  The 1978 constitution rejected the legacy 
of Francoist centralization and actively recognized Spain’s regional diversity. To achieve 
these goals, the constitution created the State of Autonomies, the decentralized 
governmental system that divides Spain into seventeen autonomous communities. While 
Carrascal and de Esteban believe the State of Autonomies has deteriorated Spanish unity 
by allowing too much power for individual autonomous communities, Catalans widely 
believe their region does not possess an appropriate level of self-government. This 
Catalan belief appears in the rhetoric surrounding the broader argument of independence, 
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as well as specific responses to the court ruling. Take, for instance, Lopéz Tena’s 
declaration that the ruling “marks the end of self-government,” in addition to Artur Mas’ 
aforementioned statement that the “constitutional pact [had] reached its limits.” At the 
very least, Catalan commentators call for a re-evaluation of the constitutional pact that 
defines the separation of powers between the central state and the autonomous 
communities, Roca i Junyent providing one example.   
Presenting a specific political issue as a serious threat to the viability of a 
country’s constitution may sound like political maneuvering designed to paint opposing 
viewpoints in a negative light. Yet, when one considers Spanish history and the context 
within which the new democratic system developed, it becomes clear that this 
characterization of the court’s ruling possesses legitimate factual basis. For centuries, 
Spain’s level of recognition of its own pluralistic make up has wavered. Madrid’s gradual 
consolidation of power first led to the Catalan revolt in 1640, before Philip V abolished 
Catalan governing institutions in 1714 while imposing Castilian identity throughout the 
region – actions which, more than three centuries later, remain a prominent point of 
contention amongst Catalans. In the 1930s, Franco aimed to reaffirm Spanish unity after 
what he viewed as national decline during the Second Spanish Republic, a period during 
which Catalonia achieved significant political autonomy. 
 Franco’s rule oppressed regional cultures and promoted a narrowly defined 
Castilian identity. After the dictator’s death, the pendulum swung once again in the other 
direction. The 1978 constitution makes efforts to acknowledge Spain’s plurality, through 
references to “the peoples” of Spain, legal acknowledgment of multiple “nationalities” 
within the country, and designation of regional languages like Catalan and Basque as 
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official within their respective regions. The document also decentralizes political power. 
It must be emphasized, then, that these efforts were not only designed to answer a 
pressing question at that specific point in time, but were rather the result of a centuries-
long tension within Spain over how the country should account for its own pluralism. 
Yet, as addressed, the 1978 constitution fails to definitively resolve this question: while it 
creates autonomous communities and recognizes unique regional identities, it also 
“affirms the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common fatherland of all 
Spaniards” (Edwards 672). Thus, this system creates potential for conflict: while regional 
cultures must be acknowledged and respected, the amount of power these regions are 
allowed must not be to a degree that threatens Spanish unity.   
Given this context, the significance of commentators on both sides of the issue 
choosing to frame the court ruling as a definitive test for the State of Autonomies cannot 
be overstated. This characterization is valid because the court ruling defines the amount 
of autonomy to which autonomous communities can aspire, and also because the 1978 
constitution specifically introduces statutes of autonomy as the method through which the 
communities can pursue this autonomy. The commentators’ arguments frame the debate 
not only as the final judgment on the project of decentralization initiated by the 
democratic transition in 1978, but as the culmination of centuries’ worth of strife and 
tension within Spain. So, it is understandable that the commentators give such gravity to 
the situation in their editorials – they question the viability of Spain’s constitution, which, 
by extension, casts doubt on the future of Spain itself.  
These characterizations of the debate raise the question of what the State of 
Autonomies was originally intended to be. While the system grants significant political 
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autonomy to the individual autonomous communities, this autonomy in and of itself does 
not appear to be the reason for the system’s existence. Rather, it appears that political 
power and self-determination is a means by which Spain’s diverse communities can 
achieve proper recognition of their unique nature. Consider, for instance, the remarks of 
Catalonia’s president, José Montilla. Montilla stresses that the ruling is important not 
because of its “practical effects” on the Generalitat’s capacities, but because the statute 
was a “symbol.” Therefore, Montilla believes that the court’s decision “debilitates 
Spanish unity” and damages Catalan “dignity.” Montilla’s view stands in direct contrast 
with that of Zapatero: whereas Zapatero stresses the specific policy improvements the 
statute granted Catalonia, Montilla holds that policy is not particularly important. 
Similarly, the Catalan newspaper Diari de Girona’s article on the ruling notes that the 
court upheld most of the statute’s provisions, but also notes that some of the “most 
symbolic” provisions of the statute did not survive.  
These reactions seem to depict Catalans as more concerned with achieving 
recognition and respect as a unique entity within the Spanish state than they are focused 
on specific policy goals, such as attaining better financial and economic circumstances. 
The editorials discussed in this paper generally support this observation. Commentators 
on all sides of the issue rarely focus their criticisms on the policy-oriented implications of 
the court’s decision to strike down specific provisions. This indicates that the significance 
of the State of Autonomies goes beyond its strictly policy-oriented implications. Rather, 
it appears that, as Chacon Piqueras and González Márquez suggest, “the constitution and 
the statutes [ . . . ] are norms that permit the coexistence of diverse identities in the same 
space.” This belief allows for the authors’ view of Spain as a “nation of nations.”  
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In other words, the significance of the State of Autonomies lies in how the system 
permits the diverse group of communities that make up the Spanish state to achieve 
recognition of their particularities and define their relationships with one another. Thus, 
the debate over the statute encapsulates the fundamental, longstanding debate within 
Spain over how to define the state given its pluralistic makeup. Ridao alludes to this 
sentiment in “Era innecesario el estatut?” when he argues that the State of Autonomies 
provides a framework for resolving economic policy agreements, but argues that it is 
unable to define “what is a nation and what is not.” Given Ridao’s conclusion that the 
State of Autonomies faces serious problems, the implication of this statement appears to 
be that the system is incapable of solving one of the defining conflicts of Spanish history: 
how to account for the country’s plural makeup. This conflict that has shaped so much of 
Spanish history is also at the heart of the debate over the statute, thus justifying the 
multiple commentators’ characterizations of the ruling as possessing profound 
implications for the viability of the Spanish constitutional system.  
As evidence of the observation that the importance of State of Autonomies is 
identity-based rather than welfare-based, consider that one of the most controversial 
elements of the statute was Catalonia’s self-definition as a nation. This characterization 
met immediate resistance from PP upon the statute’s initial introduction in Madrid in 
2005, and when the court ultimately modified its legality in 2010, Catalans responded by 
marching in the streets of Barcelona behind the banner “we are a nation, we decide.” Yet 
the description of Catalonia as a nation carries no obvious policy implications. Its 
purpose is to serve as a symbolic affirmation of Catalonia’s unique identity - just like, in 
Montilla’s view, the statute itself.  
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This understanding of the issue sheds light on one of the key controversies that 
appeared in the deliberations over the statute: the “ownership of sovereignty.” Many of 
PP’s initial challenges to the statute, such as the party’s objections to the statute’s 
description of Catalan “citizens” as well as the document’s assertion that its powers 
emanated from “the Catalan people,” came from the belief that the Spanish people were 
the “only holders of national sovereignty”  (Tribunal Constitucional de España 6). Shades 
of this argument appear in Carrascal and de Esteban’s editorials. Carrascal says Catalans 
are “never happy” and “always asking for more,” which is a trend that will lead to 
“emptiness of the state.” Carrascal depicts Spain as the owners of power within the state, 
and implies that Madrid ceded a certain amount of this power to Catalonia out of its own 
generosity. De Esteban, similarly, speaks of “the autonomy conceded in [Catalonia’s] 
1979 statute of autonomy” (emphasis mine), which he believes has led to the current 
situation, in which Catalonia now has “not a statute, [but] an embryo of a constitution.” 
On the other side, in “Cataluña, Sin Estatut,” Ridao criticizes the court for subjecting 
Catalans to a statute that they did not pass, which is reminiscent of Professor Resina’s 
anger that the court would strike down a statute that was democratically written by 
parliament and passed in a referendum by the Catalan people. These two arguments 
imply a frustration at the lack of agency granted to Catalans, an irritation best summed up 
by Lopéz Tena’s lament that “we are entirely in their hands.”  
These characterizations of the significance of the State of Autonomies, and of the 
philosophical disagreements over “ownership of sovereignty,” allow for a better 
understanding of Spain’s historical debate over how to account for its own plurality. 
Throughout the country’s history, differing conceptions of the Spanish state have led to 
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conflict. This longstanding tension manifests in the debate over Catalonia’s 2006 Statute 
of Autonomy, and subsequently the controversy over the Constitutional Court’s 2010 
ruling on the statute. Conservative commentators depict Spain as the owners of 
sovereignty, having graciously permitted Catalonia to share a certain degree of this 
sovereignty with the 1978 constitution. These commentators bristle at perceived Catalan 
attempts to overstep the boundaries of this sovereignty. Meanwhile, Catalans favor an 
understanding of Spain as a “nation of nations,” one in which the state’s multiple 
nationalities and peoples are mutually respected partners.  
As evidence of this conflict over Catalonia’s rightful place in Spain, consider the 
disagreement between De La Quadra-Salcedo and Grijemlo – De La Quadra-Salcedo 
asserts that Catalonia can still find solutions to their problems by working within the 
Spanish state, whereas Grijemlo argues that those who discuss how Catalonia can “fit” 
into Spain ignore Catalonia’s distinct and unique identity. This conflict also appears in 
the statute’s deliberate efforts to assure bilateral governing capacities between Barcelona 
and Madrid, which PP challenged for being “the procedural embodiment of [ . . . ] 
bilateralism” (Tribunal Constitucional de España 25). To the Generalitat, bilateralism is 
something to be actively pursued; to PP, it is an affront to Madrid’s power deserving of a 
legal challenge. This disagreement comes from differing understandings over 
autonomous communities’ rightful place within the Spanish state, a manifestation of 
deeply held opposing viewpoints over how to properly define Spain.  
11. Conclusion 
 To conclude, conflicting definitions of the Spanish state – as the domain of 
Castile on one hand, and a decentralized “nation of nations” on the other – have led to 
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conflict throughout the country’s history. The 1978 constitution aimed to ease this 
centuries-long conflict once and for all with the creation of the State of Autonomies. The 
Spanish Constitutional Court’s 2010 ruling on Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of Autonomy 
defines the extent to which Catalonia – and therefore all of the seventeen autonomous 
communities – can aspire to autonomy within the system created by the 1978 
constitution.  
Thus, studying the controversy surrounding the statute, and the court’s ruling on 
it, serves as a useful case study for understanding historical ideological cleavages within 
Spain. Political and media commentators often depict the court ruling as having profound 
implications for the viability of Spain’s 1978 constitutional system and the State of 
Autonomies embedded within it. When one considers the historical context in which the 
1978 constitution was written, it becomes clear that these arguments are valid, and the 
conclusion that the 2010 court ruling marks a significant point in Spanish history follows.  
Yet the implications of the court’s ruling go beyond the philosophical and 
theoretical. As Catalonia’s then-president José Montilla argued, the ruling did indeed 
threaten Spanish unity, because it invigorated Catalan separatists. As of the spring of 
2016, the independence movement is as strong as ever. Separatists currently control a 
slight majority of the parliamentary seats in Barcelona. As previously addressed, on 
November 9, 2015, the Catalan parliament approved a plan to initiate separation from 
Spain (Peralta). The Constitutional Court responded on December 2, blocking the motion 
and ruling that the Spanish constitution does not grant regions to right to secede (Zarolli), 
an impasse that has not yet been resolved.  
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 In Madrid, the prospect of Catalan independence has prevented Spain from filling 
the office of prime minister. Mariano Rajoy, the leader of PP during the time frame 
examined in this paper, went on to serve as Spain’s prime minister beginning in 2011. 
His term effectively ended upon the national elections in late 2015, during which PP saw 
its share of parliamentary seats significantly decrease. Yet no party won an outright 
majority, and efforts to form a majority coalition between PSOE and new left-wing party 
Podemos have stalled, one of the principle reasons being the two parties’ disagreement 
over whether or not to allow Catalans to vote on an independence referendum (Nayler).  
 So, the debate over Catalan independence, directly inspired by the 2010 
Constitutional Court ruling on the statute, has already created a governmental crisis 
within Spain. Returning to the theoretical implications of the Catalan independence 
movement, if Catalonia were indeed to successfully secede, Spain would lose more than 
ten percent each of its population, territory and GDP. Such a seismic shift could create 
significant uncertainty in a country already wrought with economic and political distress, 
leading to wide-ranging policy debates with no clear resolution (Alexander). It is very 
possible that Spain would not be in this position of uncertainty and tension had the 
Constitutional Court ruled differently in 2010, or had PP not opposed the statute so 
vehemently from the beginning. Thus, the controversy over Catalonia’s 2006 Statute of 
Autonomy does indeed present major questions about Spain’s future. The issue reveals 
profound philosophical differences over the conception of the Spanish state, casts doubt 
on the viability of Spain’s constitutional system, and the invigoration of Catalan 
separatism that occurred after the court ruling has already hindered the functioning of the 
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Spanish government. If, theoretically, Catalonia were to achieve independence, then these 
effects would only become more severe.  
For all of these reasons, one can argue that the court ruling did indeed mark a 
critical juncture, or perhaps even an ending point, for the State of Autonomies. The 
system was designed to appease Spain’s regional nationalities and include them within 
the conception of the Spanish state. However, it ultimately failed to bar one of these 
regional nationalities from seriously pursuing independence, and thus rejecting the status 
quo that the State of Autonomies introduced. While the State of Autonomies aimed to 
encourage harmony and coexistence among all of Spain’s peoples, it did not prevent what 
is now a serious political crisis that continues with no end in sight.  
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